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DEVELOPMENTS IN CANADIAN 
ADULT GUARDIANSHIP AND  
CO-DECISION-MAKING LAW
Guardianship was originally developed as a social and legal tool meant to protect 
vulnerable persons.  It is now evolving as a mechanism to promote autonomy. This 
paper examines the Canadian law of guardianship, including its historical evolution, 
the social and legal catalysts for its reform and related constitutional issues.
 
Guardianship law has a long history in Western society, and has traditionally 
been paternalistic and property-focused.  Early Canadian guardianship laws were 
largely based on English lunacy acts, and continued unchanged into the second 
half of the twentieth century. Reformation in Canadian guardianship law began 
in the 1970s and 80s, with criticism that the current law intruded unjustifiably 
into an individual’s personal sphere of autonomy. This criticism arose from an 
increased understanding of human capacity and the recognition of autonomy as a 
foundational human right.
In 2000, Saskatchewan introduced comprehensive guardianship legislation: 
The Adult Guardianship and Co-decision-making Act.  This Act authorizes the 
appointment of co-decision-makers as an alternative to the traditional court-
appointed guardian. This alternative provides Saskatchewan courts the ability to 
effectively address the need and capacity of the adult in question.  The co-decision-
making provisions of the Act are unique in Canadian guardianship law: the co-
decision-maker shares legal authority with the adult, must acquiesce to an adult’s 
reasonable decision and is statutorily required to minimally interfere in the adult’s 
life and decision-making process. The co-decision-maker is further required to act in 
a manner that protects the adult’s civil and human rights. 
The Saskatchewan Act represents an important attempt to rethink guardianship 
concepts in Canada, and should form the model for future guardianship legislation 
in this country. 
SARAH BURNINGHAM†
† LL.B. (University of Saskatchewan).  The author will be clerking at the Saskatchewan 
Court of Appeal for 2009-2010.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Guardianship was originally developed as a social and legal tool meant 
to protect vulnerable persons. Now, in some jurisdictions, guardianship 
is evolving as a mechanism to promote autonomy. Guardianship regimes 
will become increasingly important as the Canadian population ages and 
awareness of elder legal issues grows.1 In this paper I examine Canadian 
guardianship law, including its historical evolution, the social and legal 
catalysts prompting its reform, related constitutional issues and how these 
laws reflect social values and understandings. Through this examination 
of guardianship regimes and historical developments, I argue that, despite 
some serious concerns, Saskatchewan’s The Adult Guardianship and Co-
decision-making Act2 and its co-decision-making provisions represent the 
most important attempt to rethink guardianship concepts in Canada and 
should form the model for future guardianship legislation in this country.
II. DEFINITION AND EXPLANATION OF ADULT 
GUARDIANSHIP
Adult guardianship is “the legal relationship whereby the legal rights, 
possessions, and decision-making power of one person (the ward)3 are 
1  See e.g. Dorothy Lipovenko, “Lawyers find more work among seniors: ‘Elder law’ is 
being driven by an aging population not only anticipating its needs but responding to 
changes in legislation” The Globe and Mail (2 December 1996) A1; Mark Andrews, “The 
Elderly in Guardianship: A Crisis of Constitutional Proportions” (1997) 5 Elder L.J. 75 at 
76. Guardianship is particularly relevant in Canada, as estimates suggest that as much as 
25 % of the population will be over 65 by 2041: Marla Fletcher, “The Abuse Stops Here” 
(2000) 96 The Canadian Nurse 18.
2  The Adult Guardianship and Co-decision-making Act, S.S. 2000 c. A-5.3 [Sask. Act 2000].
3  I will refer to the “ward” as the adult throughout this paper, using the language 
employed in Saskatchewan’s Act. References to archaic language, such as “lunatic,” will be 
made in quotation marks to identify it as such. Language is particularly important because 
it affects the images we have about people with disabilities: See e.g. Joan Blaska, “Speak 
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transferred to another (the guardian) once the court or any other legal 
authority has made a determination that the ward is incompetent to handle 
his or her own affairs.”4 Though academics have traditionally identified 
four categories of people subject to guardianship,5 these distinctions are 
superfluous and unnecessary. Essentially, anyone without capacity, whose 
decision-making ability is impaired, regardless of reason, can be made the 
subject of a guardianship order.6 
Guardianship can be divided into property and personal guardianship. A 
property guardian has authority over the adult’s personal and real property, 
while a personal guardian can make decisions regarding the adult’s person. 
Generally, a court can make separate orders regarding the appointment of 
property and personal guardians and, for example, appoint only a property 
guardian if the adult’s decision-making ability regarding personal matters 
is not impaired.
Personal guardianship can take many forms. The traditional form is full or 
plenary guardianship, under which the guardian is given full authority to 
make decisions for the adult, who loses legal capacity. Under a partial or 
limited guardianship order, the court lists the specific powers over which 
the guardian has authority. This limitation on the guardian’s authority is an 
attempt to respect the adult’s autonomy, encourage independent decision-
making and potentially aid the adult in regaining functional capacity.7 In 
and Write Using ‘Person First’” in Mark Nagler ed., Perspectives on disability: texts and 
readings on disability (Palo Alto: Health Markets Research, 1990) 25 at 25.
4  Israel Doron, “Mental Incapacity, Guardianship, and the Elderly: An Exploratory Study 
of Ontario’s Consent and Capacity Board” (2003) 18 Can. J.L. & Soc. 131 at 131 [Doron, 
“Capacity Board”].
5  Frolik identifies these categories as (1) the old and demented, (2) the mentally ill, (3) 
the mentally retarded and (4) the unconscious: Lawrence Frolik, “Promoting Judicial 
Acceptance and Use of Limited Guardianship” (2001-2002) 31 Stetson L. Rev. 735 at 
745 [Frolik, “Judicial Acceptance”]. One reason to avoid these categories is to avoid the 
offensive and stigmatizing language that accompanies such classifications.
6  Genevra Richardson, “Autonomy, Guardianship and Mental Disorder: One Problem, 
Two Solutions” (2002) 65 Mod. L. Rev. 702 at 702.
7  Christy Holmes, “Surrogate Decisionmaking in the 90s: Learning to Respect Our 
Elders” (1996-1997) 28 U. Tol. L. Rev. 605 at 619. I do not believe partial guardianship 
is the best method to obtain these objectives; co-decision-making, as discussed below, is 
preferable. 
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1976, Alberta was the first province to pass legislation allowing for partial 
guardianship.8 Most English Canadian provinces have since followed suit 
and now allow for some type of partial personal guardianship, including 
Manitoba,9 Ontario,10 Saskatchewan,11 British Columbia,12 Prince Edward 
Island,13 the Yukon14 and the Northwest Territories.15 The acts in New 
Brunswick,16 Nova Scotia,17 and Newfoundland18 do not provide for partial 
guardianship.
The third model is co-decision-making (also known as supported or 
assisted decision-making), in which a co-decision-maker assists the 
adult in making decisions, rather than making decisions for him. Unlike 
traditional guardianship, which strips the adult of legal authority, adults 
and co-decision-makers share authority. Co-decision-making recognizes 
the informal support systems characteristic of every decision-making 
process and provides a legal framework which attempts to benefit adults 
who need such assistance. Professor Doug Surtees suggests we think 
about co-decision-making as a process we would go through when 
making a major decision.19 First we may consult our spouses and other 
family members who may be affected by the decision, which is equivalent 
to the information gathering stage of decision-making.20 Spouses and 
friends may also help with the process of decision-making by helping us 
focus on our values and preferences.21 This is a common approach every 
8  Dependent Adults Act, S.A. 1976, c. 63, s. 6(1) [Alta. Act 1976].
9  Vulnerable Persons Living with a Mental Disability Act, S.M. 1993, c. 29, C.C.S.M., c. 
V-90, s. 57(1).
10  Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 30, s. 60(1) [Ont. Act].
11  Sask. Act 2000, supra note 2, s. 14(1)(b).
12  Adult Guardianship Act, R.S.B.C. 1996 (Supp.), c. 6, s. 19 [not yet in force] [B.C. Act].
13  Adult Protection Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. A-5, s. 16(2) [P.E.I. Protection Act].
14  Adult Protection and Decision Making Act, S.Y. 2003, c. 21, Sched. A, s. 38 [Y.K. Act].
15  Guardianship and Trusteeship Act, S.N.W.T. 1994, c. 29, s. 11(2) [N.W.T. Act].
16  Infirm Persons Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. I-8 [N.B. Act].
17  Incompetent Persons Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 218 [N.S. Act].






19  Doug Surtees, Co-Decision Making: Making Assumptions and Making Decisions 
(Vancouver: Canadian Conference on Elder Law, 2005) at 9 [Surtees, Co-Decision 
Making].
20  Ibid. 
21  Ibid. at 10.
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individual takes when making major decisions and is similar to a formal 
co-decision-making regime.22 In preserving the adult’s legal capacity, co-
decision-making legislation recognizes that individuals engage daily in 
“interdependent decision-making,” and “this interdependence is not seen 
as indicative of mental incapability.”23 By providing a formalized version 
of informal support systems, this legislation abandons the stigmatizing 
labels of “capable” and “incapable,” which have coloured other acts. Rather, 
such legislation simply recognizes “[s]ome people require more in the way 
of support and assistance than others, and with respect to more areas of 
decision-making than others; it is a matter of degree, rather than a case of 
absolutes.”24
Co-decision-making attracts its share of criticism. First, there is concern 
that statutorily instituted co-decision-making will undermine informal 
decision-making regimes, which arise from intimate and trusting 
relationships. Formal regimes “cannot compensate for the absence of 
the bonds that link the individuals in an adult’s network of family and 
friends[...]Supported decision-making is more than a formal legal status 
granted by a court; it is a process that occurs over time and that will 
invariably require more than a short-term commitment to address a 
particular and temporary need.”25 Second, there is a risk that co-decision-
making may morph into de facto substitute decision-making if the co-
decision-maker makes decisions for the adult without considering the 
adult’s input.26 This may be especially worrisome when the adult has 
difficulty communicating her decision and the co-decision-maker finds it 
easier to make the decision for her.27
22  Ibid.
23  Robert Gordon, “The Emergence of Assisted (Supported) Decision-Making in the 
Canadian Law of Adult Guardianship and Substitute Decision-Making” (2000) 23 Int’l J. 
L. Psychiatry 61 at 65 [Gordon, “Assisted”].
24  Ibid. 
25  Ibid. at 73. Saskatchewan’s Act recognizes and addresses this problem by providing 
that “where practicable, the court shall appoint a property co-decision-maker or property 
guardian who has a long-standing caring relationship with the adult”: Sask. Act 2000, 
supra note 2, s. 40(3)(b).
26  Gordon, “Assisted,” ibid. at 74.
27  In an attempt to remedy this problem, Saskatchewan’s Act provides that “adults who 
have difficulty communicating because of physical or mental disabilities are entitled to 
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I note that these criticisms are not directed at co-decision-making itself 
or the principles behind it. Rather, they are focused on the challenges 
that may emerge in implementing a formal co-decision-making regime. 
Therefore, such criticisms are not a valid reason to avoid co-decision-
making legislation. Rather, courts and lawyers must consider and address 
these potential problems when determining what is appropriate for a 
particular adult. These concerns can be further remedied by educating 
lawyers and co-decision-makers on their roles and responsibilities.
A. Canadian Co-decision-making Legislation
In Canada, currently only Saskatchewan,28 Manitoba29 and the Yukon30 
have co-decision-making legislation. Both Prince Edward Island31 and 
British Columbia32 have guardianship legislation that would provide for 
co-decision-making, but the legislation in both provinces is not in force. 
Saskatchewan’s Act is the most comprehensive legislation, allowing the 
court to issue a co-decision-making order in both property and personal 
matters.33 The Yukon’s legislation does not allow courts to make co-
decision-making orders, but does allow adults to enter into co-decision-
making agreements if the adult understands the nature and effect of 
such an agreement.34 Manitoba’s Act is similarly narrowed, applying 
only to “vulnerable persons”, defined as adults with mental disabilities 
that manifested prior to 18 years of age, whose intellectual functioning 
and adaptive behaviour is impaired.35 Such a distinction is arbitrary and 
unnecessarily excludes adults with mental disabilities manifested after 18 
communicate by any means that enables them to be understood”: Sask. Act 2000, supra 
note 2, s. 3(e).
28  Sask. Act 2000, supra note 2, s. 14.
29   The Vulnerable Persons Living With a Mental Disability Act, S.M. 1993, c. 29, s. 9 
[Man. Act]. 
30  Y.K. Act, supra note 14, s. 38.
31  Supported Decision Making and Adult Guardianship Act, S.P.E.I. 1997, c. 49.
32  B.C. Act, supra note 12.
33  Sask. Act 2000, supra note 2, s. 14.
34  Y.K. Act, supra note 14, s. 6.
35  Man. Act, supra note 29, ss. 1(1), 3.
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years, elderly people with dementia and people whose mental disabilities 
are attributable to accidents.
I would suggest that a combination of Saskatchewan and the Yukon’s 
legislation may be indicative of future guardianship legislation, which 
will allow adults to enter co-decision-making agreements or courts to 
make co-decision-making orders. Allowing both alternatives ensures a 
flexible co-decision-making regime. The alternative ultimately chosen 
should reflect an adult’s particular capabilities. Some adults may be fully 
capable in all areas and able to enter co-decision-making agreements, 
while other adults may be capable in particular areas and well served by 
a court order that provides for co-decision-making in these areas and 
guardianship in other areas. At present, however, Saskatchewan’s Act is the 
most comprehensive and inclusive and, accordingly, should form the basis 
for future legislation across Canada. In adopting from Saskatchewan’s Act, 
other provincial legislatures should consider including the above provision 
from the Yukon’s Act. Adopting such provisions recognizes the weaknesses 
of Saskatchewan’s Act, but allows other provinces to improve the regime 
by developing solutions and embracing new ideas recognized since the 
passage of Saskatchewan’s legislation.
While most provinces do not provide for co-decision-making, many 
statutes mandate consultation between the guardian and the adult and 
require the guardian to encourage the adult to participate in decisions. For 
example, the Ontario Act provides that “[t]he guardian shall encourage 
the person to participate, to the best of his or her abilities, in the guardian’s 
decisions on his or her behalf.”36 However, I would argue that statutorily 
mandated consultation or encouragement is not equivalent to co-decision-
making. Despite consultation, an adult under guardianship still loses legal 
capacity. The depth and scope of consultation is not defined. Because the 
guardian is not required to share authority with the adult, consultation may 
be only cursory, without the meaningful exchange required under a co-
decision-making order.
36  Ont. Act, supra note 10, s. 66(5). This is essentially identical to the Northwest 
Territories’ act: N.W.T. Act, supra note 15, s. 12(8).
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III. HISTORY OF GUARDIANSHIP LEGISLATION
Below, I will examine the historical evolution of guardianship legislation 
in Western Europe traditions, followed by an examination of Canadian 
legislation.
B. Western Europe and England
Guardianship law has a long history in Western society. Indeed, “[f]or 
over 500 years, the societal response to adult mental incapacity has been 
guardianship.”37 Prior to guardianship, ancient societies’ taboos and tribal 
customs dictated responses to mental and physical disabilities and often 
included the popular belief that these disabilities were “punishments” to 
be cured by “magic.”38 The advancement of medical knowledge in Ancient 
Greece resulted in the first organized guardianship-type system used to 
protect property.39
The first written guardianship laws can be traced back to 449 B.C. in  
Rome, which had an elaborate system of guardianship.40 Roman law 
provided: “If a person is a fool, let this person and his goods be under the 
protection of his family or his paternal relatives, if he is not under the care 
of anyone.”41 
 
37  Lawrence Frolik, “Guardianship Reform: When the Best is the Enemy of the Good” 
(1998) 9 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 347 at 347 [Frolik, “Enemy”].
38  Frank Johns, “Guardianship Folly: The Misgovernment of Parens Patriae and the 
Forecast of its Crumbling Linkage to Unprotected Older Americans in the Twenty-First 
Century” (1997-1998) 27 Stetson L. Rev. 1 at 8.
39  Ibid. at 10.
40  Ibid. at 10, 14.
41  Ibid. at 10. “This law applied only to the head of a family, since all other persons were 
‘under the care’ of the heads of their families, who automatically had authority over their 
persons and affairs”: Paul McLaughlin, Guardianship of the Person (Downsview, Ont.: 
National Institute on Mental Retardation, 1979) at 37.
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England’s guardianship laws originated sometime between 1255 and 1290 
A.D., with the enactment of the de Praerogativa Regis, which vested in the 
King power over his subjects and their lands, including custodial authority 
over “lunatics” and their property.42 Over time, this jurisdiction was 
delegated to the Court of Chancery.43  
In the nineteenth century, a series of amendments were enacted to facilitate 
the disposal of land and allow incompetency to be found on affidavit 
evidence.44 These laws were consolidated into The Lunacy Act, 1890,45 
which gave the courts “power to allow a relation or friend to take charge of 
a lunatic”46 and to make orders for the commitment of the adult’s estate.47 
The Act also allowed judges to commit adults to workhouses48 or asylums49 
without notice. As examined below, this Act formed the basis of early 
Canadian guardianship law.
42  Johns, supra note 38 at 15; Law Reform Commission of Saskatchewan, Proposals 
for a Guardianship Act, Part I: Personal Guardianship: Report to the Attorney General 
(Saskatoon: Law Reform Commission, 1983) at 77 [Sask. LRC Proposal]. Whereas the 
King had a duty to maintain the “lunatic” and his property until he recovered, the King 
had no corresponding duty to the “idiot” or his family, and his lands would be seized 
without him having any rights over it: McLaughlin, supra note 41 at 38-39. Note the 
difference between “idiots” and “lunatics”—“the lunatic, who has been sane, and may 
become sane again; and the idiot or fool natural, who never has been and never will 
be compos mentis”: T. Raleigh, “Lunacy Laws” (1885) 1 L. Q. Rev. 150 at 150. Given the 
significant consequences attached to a finding of “idiocy,” judges began substituting 
verdicts of “lunacy,” and the distinction ceased to be important when the Crown stopped 
seizing the lands of “idiots”: McLaughlin, ibid. at 40; Raleigh, ibid. at 150.
43  Melinda Munro, “Guardianship of Adults: Good Faith and the Philosophy of Mental 
Disability in British Columbia” (1997) 14 Can. J. Fam. L. 217 at 218.
44  McLaughlin, supra note 41 at 40.
45  53 Vict. c. 5 [Lunacy Act, 1890]. See generally Peter Bartlett, The Poor Law of Lunacy: 
the Administration of Pauper Lunatics in Mid-Nineteenth Century England (New York: 
Leicester University Press, 1999) at 41-4 for an examination of English lunacy law.
46  Lunacy Act, 1890, ibid., s. 22.
47  Ibid., s. 108(3). Under the Act, the adult’s interest in property was not to be altered: 
ibid., s. 123.
48  Ibid., s. 20. The Act also provided that the “lunatic” was not to remain in the 
workhouse “[u]nless the accommodation in the workhouse [was] sufficient for his proper 
care and treatment”: ibid., s. 24(1)(c). The Act is not clear as to how the workhouse was to 
provide proper care and treatment. 
49  Ibid., s. 27. See Bartlett, supra note 45 at 8-26 for a socio-legal examination of the 
history of asylums and asylum law.
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C. Features of Traditional Guardianship Laws
There are several distinctive features that have historically characterized 
guardianship legislation. First, guardianship law has traditionally focused 
on the protection of the adult’s estate,50 underscoring the primacy given to 
property rights in both the common law and Western society. For example, 
there is a long tradition requiring the guardian to take accounts of the 
adult’s property and ensure its proper management.51 Often, given the time 
and costs of such applications, an applicant would not bother to apply for 
guardianship unless there was substantial property to be managed.52 This was 
likely due, at least partially, to the structure of early acts, which did not allow 
for separate property and personal guardianship orders. This “all or nothing” 
approach ensured that, if a guardian was appointed, he would be given full 
authority over both the adult’s person and property, regardless of the adult’s 
actual needs. An order granting guardianship over the person was likely 
superfluous, as an informal care arrangement was typically already in place. 
Second, guardianship laws historically have been exceedingly paternalistic. 
In the past, guardianship laws have been justified on the grounds that they 
are necessary to protect people who are unable to protect themselves.53 
Traditionally, guardianship’s primary goal has been to protect the adult 
and the adult’s estate, not promote autonomy or assist in decision-making. 
Given this paternalistic goal and the extreme intrusion into the adult’s 
sphere of self-determination, there is great potential for conflict between 
competing values as legislators attempt to manufacture statutes that both 
respect the adult’s autonomy and protect the adult from harm. This tension 
recurs throughout guardianship’s history. 
50  McLaughlin, supra note 41 at 35. The duties and responsibilities of the property 
guardian were often stated specifically and concisely, whereas the duty of the personal 
guardian  was broadly stated as caring for the general welfare of the adult: Amie 
Bruggeman, “Guardianship of Adults with Mental Retardation: Towards a Presumption of 
Competence” (1980-1981) 14 Akron L. Rev. 321 at 327.
51  See e.g. Lunacy Act, 1890, supra note 45, s. 50(1).
52  McLaughlin, supra note 41 at 36.
53  For example, in elucidating the purpose of guardianship, Frolik writes: “Guardianship 
may have conflicting interests, but it has one primary goal: the protection and 
advancement of the life and property of the incapacitated person”: Frolik, “Judicial 
Acceptance,” supra note 5 at 745 [emphasis added]. 
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D. Canada
Early Canadian guardianship laws were largely based on English lunacy 
acts, particularly the 1890 Lunacy Act.54 These laws continued essentially 
unchanged for well over the first half of the twentieth century, varying 
only slightly in form and terminology, but not in substance. Below, 
I will explore guardianship laws in Canada, focusing on Alberta and 
Saskatchewan, with particular emphasis on developments in partial 
guardianship and co-decision making. 
I selected the Saskatchewan and Alberta acts for in-depth study for 
several reasons. First, both provinces have been leaders in the Canadian 
guardianship field and accordingly offer a broader scope for study than acts 
which have not been reformed. Second, both acts have distinctive features 
that provide an opportunity to compare and contrast the effectiveness of 
various guardianship tools, as well as demonstrate how the development 
of one act has advanced the evolution of the other. Third, both acts 
are indicative of the more general trends of development in Canadian 
guardianship legislation.
1. Alberta 
The first Alberta acts to address guardianship were a collection of insanity 
acts55 based on the English Lunacy Act. These were “updated” in 1922 by 
The Lunatics’ Estates Act,56 which applied to “lunatics”57 and allowed the 
Lieutenant Governor to appoint an Administrator of Lunatics’ Estates who 
54  Robert Gordon, Simon Verdun-Jones & Donald MacDougall, “Reforms in the Field 
of Adult Guardianship Law: A Comment on Recent Developments” (1987) 6 Can. J. 
Fam. L. 149 at 151 [Gordon et al., “Comment”]. In some provinces, provisions in more 
general acts gave courts power to appoint committees. These early acts were: Lunacy Act, 
R.S.O. 1887, c. 54 (Ontario); Lunacy Act, R.S.B.C. 1897, c. 126 (British Columbia); An 
Act respecting Lunatics, S.M. 1877, c. 23 (Manitoba); The Supreme Court in Equity Act, 
C.S.N.B. 1903, c. 112, s. 231 (New Brunswick); Of Wills and Testaments, C.S.N.L. 1872, 
c. 13, s. 13 (Newfoundland); Of the Custody and Estates of Lunatics, R.S.N.S. 1851, c. 152 
(Nova Scotia); and The Chancery Act, S.P.E.I. 1910, c. 8, s. 94 (Prince Edward Island).
55  The Insanity Act, S.A. 1907, c. 7; An Act to Appoint an Administrator of Lunatics’ 
Estates, S.A. 1916, c. 11.
56  R.S.A. 1922, c. 225.
57  “‘Lunatic’ shall include an idiot or other person of unsound mind”: ibid., s. 2(b).
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would take control of the real and personal property of the “lunatic”58 and 
become guardian of any “lunatic” detained in an asylum or institution.59
This Act was replaced in 1937 by The Estates of the Mentally Incompetent 
Act,60 which allowed the court to appoint a committee of estate to take 
control of the adult’s property.61 The Act did not allow for separate orders 
to be made for personal and property guardians; if an adult was found to 
be in need of a property guardian, an order would also be made appointing 
a guardian of the person. Given the absence of personal guardian 
provisions, personal guardians were consequently provided with no 
guidance as to their duties and responsibilities. Despite the seeming turn to 
more sensitive language, any progress was illusory as a “person of unsound 
mind” in the Act was defined to be “a lunatic or a mental defective.”62 There 
were no further significant changes to the law until 1976.
In 1976, Alberta passed The Dependent Adults Act, which was praised 
as innovative and cutting-edge.63  This Act was studied and adopted by 
numerous jurisdictions including Victoria and Queensland in Australia.64 
The Dependent Adults Act represented “one of the most significant attempts 
to re-think guardianship of the person.”65 
58  Ibid., s. 3.
59  Ibid., s. 4.
60  S.A. 1937, c. 33.
61  Ibid., s. 12(1). This was in contrast to the earlier act which provided that the 
Administrator would be appointed property guardian. Under this Act, the responsibility 
fell not to a government body, but anyone—typically a friend or family member—who 
applied to the court for guardianship.
62  Ibid., s. 2(c). The Act was revised in 1955, but a “person of unsound mind” was still 
defined as “a lunatic, a mentally incapacitated person or a mental defective”: The Mentally 
Incapacitated Persons Act, R.S.A. 1955, c. 201, s. 2(e).  Such stigmatizing and offensive 
language has plagued guardianship laws historically, and, in some provinces, continues 
to do so. For example, Nova Scotia’s act referred to “lunatics” (N.S. Act, supra note 17, 
s. 2(b)) until 2007’s An Act to Amend Chapter 218 of the Revised Statutes, 1989, the 
Incompetent Persons Act, and Certain Other Statutes, S.N.S. 2007, c. 17, ss. 2, 5, 7.
63  Gordon et al., “Comment,” supra note 54 at 152.
64  Ibid. at 152; Terry Carney, “The Limits and the Social Legacy of Guardianship in 
Australia” (1988-1989) 18 Fed. L. Rev. 231 at 231.
65  McLaughlin, supra note 41 at 49.
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The 1976 Act represented a bold change in the direction of guardianship 
law and was important for several reasons. First, it was “built around the 
notion of functional disability, rather than, ‘mental incompetency’.”66 The 
Act sought to avoid identifying adults as “lunatics” or “incapable,” moving 
away from the stigmatizing labels that had coloured old acts. Rather, it 
relied on a functional test, defining a “dependent adult” as a person who 
had a guardianship or trusteeship67 order.68 
Second, it “endorse[d] the principle of limited, tailormade, guardianship.”69 
Changing understandings of capacity prompted the development of partial 
guardianship, as human functioning was seen as a spectrum of abilities 
rather than absolutes. By enabling the adult to make decisions in areas 
in which she had capacity, her autonomy would be respected as much 
as possible given her particular abilities. In embracing this less intrusive 
approach, the statute mandated that the court not appoint a plenary 
guardian unless “satisfied that a partial guardianship order would be 
insufficient to meet the needs of the person.”70 
Third, the Act was novel in that it required the adult to be served with 
a copy of the guardianship application.71 In the past, there was no such 
requirement, and a guardianship application could be made without the 
adult receiving notice. 
Finally, the Act established the Public Guardian and Trustee, which would 
apply to be guardian or trustee when no one else was willing or able to 
66  Gordon et al., “Comment,” supra note 54 at 152.
67  Trusteeship is the term used for property guardianship in The Dependent Adults Act.
68  Alta. Act 1976, supra note 8, s. 1(d). 
69  Gordon et al., “Comment,” supra note 54 at 152. Section 6 allows the Court to appoint 
a plenary or partial personal guardian: Alta. Act 1976, ibid., s. 6(1). The statute included 
a list of matters over which the court could grant authority to the guardian, including 
living arrangements, social activities, nature and type of work, training and education, 
applications for licences or permits, legal proceedings not involving the estate and day to 
day decisions including diet and dress: ibid., s. 10(2). This list has since been imported 
into most reformed guardianship statutes.
70  Alta. Act 1976, ibid., s. 6(3). 
71  Ibid., s. 3(2)(a).
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serve.72 Presumably the purpose of such a provision was to ensure that no 
one would fall through the cracks because they lacked family or friends 
willing or able to be appointed guardian. 
The Alberta Act has been revised twice since 1976,73 but the substance of 
the Act has remained the same. One major change was the structuring of 
the partial guardianship provisions. The 2000 revision did away with the 
distinction between plenary and partial guardianship, providing only a 
list of powers and instructing the court to specify the matters within the 
guardian’s authority.74 Other changes were mostly procedural in nature.75
There have been no significant changes to the Alberta Act since it was 
revised in 2000. However, a new act is currently under consideration 
by the Alberta Legislature. Bill 24,76 the proposed Adult Guardianship 
and Trusteeship Act, was introduced on June 2, 2008 and passed its third 
reading November 6, 2008.77 While the Bill allows for personal co-
72  Ibid., ss. 12, 13, 33.
73  The first revision occurred in 1980: Dependent Adults Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. D-32 [Alta. 
Act 1980]. The second revision occurred in 2000: Dependent Adults Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. 
D-11 [Alta. Act 2000]. One noteworthy change involved the nature of the judge’s inquiry 
before appointing a personal guardian. The 1976 Act provided that the court would make 
an order when the adult was in need of a guardian and unable “(i) to care for himself, 
and (ii) to make reasonable judgment in respect of all or any of the matters relating to 
his person”: Alta. Act 1976, supra note 8, s. 6(1). The 2000 Act required that the adult be 
“repeatedly or continuously unable” to do (i) and (ii): Alta. Act 2000, supra note 73, s. 7(1)
(b). Presumably, the applicant would have to demonstrate that the adult’s inability to care 
for herself had a history, rather than one or two incidents.
74 Alta. Act 2000, ibid., s. 10(3). The 2000 Act also did not include a similar provision to 
s. 6(3) of the 1976 Act, which required that the court appoint a plenary guardian only 
if satisfied a partial guardian would be insufficient. While one may worry that the lack 
of such a provision could result in increased plenary orders, s. 19(1) of the 2000 Act 
provides that the guardian is to exercise her authority in the least restrictive way possible, 
suggesting that the guardian’s powers will still be strictly limited.
75  For example, the 1980 Act removed the provision that allowed incapacity to be found 
on the evidence of a therapist: compare Alta. Act 1976, supra note 8, s. 2 with Alta Act 
1980, supra note 73, s. 2.
76  Bill 24, Adult Guardianship and Trusteeship Act, 1st Sess., 27th Leg., Alberta, 2008 [Bill 
24].
77  Legislative Assembly of Alberta, Bill 24: Status of Bills, online: <www.assembly.ab.ca/
net/index.aspx?p=bills_status&selectbill=024>; “Alberta Hansard Excerpts” Alberta 
Justice, online: <www.justice.gov.ab.ca/hansard/default.aspx?id=5584>.
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decision-making, it does not provide for property co-decision-making. 
This omission suggests that property considerations still dominate 
guardianship law.
Bill 24 would allow for personal co-decision-making in two ways. First, 
it would allow an adult, who understands the nature and effect of an 
authorization, to make a supported decision-making authorization,78 in 
which the adult authorizes a supporter to help “access, collect or obtain 
or assist the adult in accessing, collecting or obtaining from any person 
any information that is relevant to the decision and to assist the adult in 
understanding that information [and] to assist the adult in making the 
decision.”79 In addition, an adult or interested person could apply to the 
court for an order appointing a co-decision-maker.80 This is similar to the 
merger of the Yukon and Saskatchewan co-decision-making provisions 
that I advocated above.  
Despite Alberta’s innovative advances in the 1970s, I would suggest that 
Alberta is falling behind in the guardianship field, particularly given the 
emergence of supported decision-making in Saskatchewan and other 
provinces. The proposed Bill would ensure that Alberta remains in line 
with current developments in the adult guardianship field.
2. Saskatchewan
Saskatchewan enacted its first guardianship legislation in 1919 in the 
form of The Lunacy Act,81 modeled on the English Lunacy Act.82 The 
Act gave courts the power to make orders “for committing the custody 
of lunatics and the management of their estates.”83 Similar to the 
early Alberta acts, it did not allow for separate personal guardian and 
property guardian orders and there were no provisions giving guidance 
78  Bill 24, supra note 76, cl. 4(1).
79  Ibid., cl. 4(2).
80  Ibid., cl. 13(1).
81  S.S. 1918-1919, c. 58 [Sask. Act 1919].
82  Sask. LRC Proposal, supra note 42 at 77.
83  Sask. Act 1919, supra note 81, s. 3. “Lunatic” was defined as an “idiot and a person of 
unsound mind”: ibid., s. 2(5).
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to personal guardians. Interestingly, an application could be brought 
by essentially any person, including an adult’s creditor.84 This broad 
group of potential applicants could be open to abuse and was narrowed 
in subsequent acts, which required the applicant to have “a sufficient 
interest in the personal affairs of the person.”85 The Act also preserved 
the adult’s right to have the issue of “lunacy” tried by jury,86 which was 
not included in subsequent acts.87 
Saskatchewan’s guardianship legislation remained virtually unchanged 
until 1989.88 In 1978, The Mentally Disordered Persons Act89 was 
enacted, but, despite the new name, the substance of the old Act 
remained. For example, “mentally disordered person” was defined as 
“an idiot and a person of unsound mind,”90 identical to the definition in 
the 1919 Act. In other sections, the same archaic, cumbersome language 
remained. For example, the 1919 Act provided that the Act extended 
to a person who was not an “idiot,” but “whom it is proved to the 
satisfaction of the court, that he is, through mental infirmity, arising 
from disease, age, or other cause, or by reason of habitual drunkenness 
or the use of drugs, incapable of managing his affairs.”91 Remarkably, 
nearly sixty years later, the 1978 Act read: “whom it is proved to the 
satisfaction of the court that he is, through mental infirmity, arising 
from disease, age or other cause, or by reason of habitual drunkenness 
or the use of drugs, incapable of managing his affairs.”92 Apparently, in 
84  Ibid., s. 6(2).
85  The Dependent Adults Act, S.S. 1989-1990, c. D-25.1, s. 3(1)(a) [Sask. Act 1989].
86  Sask. Act 1919, supra note 81, s. 8.
87  As early as the beginning of the twentieth century, academics recognized the problems 
associated with juries deciding issues of competency. In 1909, for example, F. Fenning 
wrote that competency questions were inquiries, not trials, and  “[t]he abolition of the 
trial by jury in lunacy matters is but an application of modern humanitarian views to the 
original conception of a lunatic”: Frederick Fenning, “The Lunatic, A Ward of the Court” 
(1909) 43 Am. L. Rev. 527 at 529.
88  Sask. LRC Proposal, supra note 42 at 77.
89  R.S.S. 1978, c. M-14 [Sask. Act 1978].
90  Ibid., s. 2(e).
91  Sask. Act 1919, supra note 81, s. 37.
92  Sask. Act 1978, supra note 89, s. 42. An issue remains about whether “drunkards” or 
drug addicts should be made the subject of guardianship orders. In her 2005 book, Mary 
Quinn seems to contemplate it: Mary Joy Quinn, Guardianship of Adults: Achieving Justice, 
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a time span of over half a century, the only thing the Legislature found 
the need to change was a comma.
In 1983, likely in response to Alberta’s The Dependent Adults Act, the 
Saskatchewan Law Reform Commission released its proposal for a new 
guardianship act. The Commission was extremely critical of the existing 
Act, noting the absence of guidance for courts in appointing a personal 
guardian and for guardians in exercising their authority, and concluding 
that “the existing Saskatchewan law is inadequate.”93 In its proposal, the 
Commission advocated for partial guardianship to “protect the protected 
from being over-protected.”94
In 1989, the Province passed the Dependent Adults Act, modeled on 
the 1976 Alberta Act. Distinguishing itself from its Saskatchewan 
predecessors and adopting from its Albertan precursor, the new Act did 
away with stigmatizing labels, opting instead for the functional tests laid 
out in the Alberta Act.95 The Act was divided into personal and property 
guardianship and allowed for partial guardianship, which required 
the court to specify the powers over which the guardian would have 
authority.96 Section 7(2) of the Act further required that the court not make 
a plenary guardianship order unless satisfied a partial guardianship “would 
be insufficient to meet the needs of the dependent adult.”97 The Act also 
Autonomy, and Safety (New York: Springer Publishing Company, 2005) at 49. Additionally, 
Nova Scotia’s Inebriates’ Guardianship Act, R.S.N.C. 1989, c. 227, c. 17 allows a judge to 
find a habitual drunkard (defined as “any person who in the neighbourhood in which he 
resides has the reputation of being a drunkard”: ibid., s. 2(a)) incapable of managing his 
property affairs, if he squanders or mismanages his property, places his family in distress 
or transacts his business prejudicially to the interests of his family: ibid., s. 3. If alcoholism 
and drug addiction are seen as disabilities and impair decision-making ability, they appear 
similar to the situations of other adults under guardianship orders. If this view is correct, 
a court must inquire whether the adult, despite his addiction, retains capacity to make 
decisions. However, fundamental values of autonomy and self-determination may suggest 
otherwise, given that such a broad definition as found in the Nova Scotia Inebriates’ 
Guardianship Act may be subject to abuse.  
93  Sask. LRC Proposal, supra note 42 at 78.
94  Ibid. at 71. 
95  See e.g. Sask. Act 1989, supra note 85, s. 2(1)(d). 
96  Sask. Act 1989, ibid., s. 7(1).
97  Ibid., s. 7(2).
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reflected the guardianship acts’ fundamental tension between autonomy 
and protection. For example, while some sections seemed to favour 
protection, the Act also provided a list of situations in which the guardian 
could not consent,98 suggesting the Legislature recognized the inherently 
personal and fundamental nature of some decisions and attempted to 
respect this individual realm of autonomy. The Act also required that 
personal guardians exercise their powers so as to “encourage the dependent 
adult to: (A) participate to the maximum extent in all decisions affecting 
the dependent adult; and (B) act independently in all matters in which the 
dependent adult is able.”99 
In 1994, the Provincial Steering Committee on Abuse of Adults in 
Vulnerable Circumstances was appointed.100 In their 1997 report, most 
members of the Committee accepted the need for the continuation of 
guardianship, but criticized weaknesses in administration of the Act, 
including the plethora of applications for guardianship made without 
notice to the adult and the under-use of partial guardianship.101 The 
Committee commented on the benefit of supported decision-making, 
noting that “[f]or some adults, the appointment of a personal guardian 
under The Dependent Adults Act is more than they need. They may be able 
to make their own decisions with a little help.”102
a. The Adult Guardianship and Co-decision-making Act
In 2000, Saskatchewan passed The Adult Guardianship and Co-decision-
making Act, which came into effect on July 15, 2001 and allowed for 
co-decision-making orders to be issued. In introducing this Act, the 
98  Ibid., s. 7(6), which provided that guardians could not consent to: (1) withdrawal of 
life-support systems; (2) procedures with the sole purpose of sterilization; (3) donation 
of organs; (4) abortion (except if continuing the pregnancy would likely cause imminent 
danger to life and health); (5) termination of parental rights; (6) commencement of 
divorce proceedings; and (7) interference with the adult’s exercise of religious practices 
(except to the extent the practices threatened the adult’s health or safety).
99  Ibid., s. 11(d)(ii).
100  Steering Committee on the Abuse of Adults in Vulnerable Circumstances, “Report 
and Recommendations” (December 1997), online: <http://www.justice.gov.sk.ca/vasc> at 
1.
101  Ibid. at 29.
102  Ibid.
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Legislature recognized that “[a]s our society and any society begins to 
understand more and more about the needs of vulnerable adults, we 
need to understand that not all vulnerable adults require the same level 
of support.”103 The Act provides a unique opportunity for courts to tailor 
orders to reflect the abilities and circumstances of individual adults.
Under the Act, a court must appoint a co-decision-maker where it believes 
that such an appointment is in the best interests of the adult, the adult is in 
need of a co-decision-maker and the court is satisfied the adult’s capacity 
is impaired such that decision-making assistance is required to make 
reasonable decisions about the adult’s estate104  or person.105 On the other 
hand, a court should appoint a guardian when it is satisfied that such an 
appointment is in the best interests of the adult, the adult is in need of a 
personal or property guardian and the adult’s “capacity is impaired to the 
extent that the adult is unable to make reasonable decisions with respect 
to matters relating to his or her estate”106 or person.107 However, a court 
must not appoint a guardian or a co-decision-maker unless “alternative 
ways to assist the adult...including less intrusive forms of support or 
assistance in decision-making, have been tried or carefully considered.”108 
Such provisions encourage minimal intrusion into the adult’s sphere of 
autonomy and reflect a new understanding of guardianship as a last resort. 
The co-decision-making provisions are unique. First, under the Act, the 
co-decision-maker shares legal authority with the adult.109 Second, the co-
decision-maker must acquiesce to the adult’s decision if a reasonable person 
could have made the impugned decision and no harm is likely to result to the 
adult or the adult’s estate as a result of the decision.110 Third, the co-decision-
maker is statutorily required to exercise her duties in a way that limits her 
103  Saskatchewan, Legislative Assembly, Hansard, No. 24 (29 May 2000) at 1395 (Rod 
Gantefor).
104  Sask. Act 2000, supra note 2, s. 40(1)(a).
105  Ibid., s. 14(1)(a).
106  Ibid., s. 40(1)(b). 
107  Ibid., s. 14(1)(b).
108  Ibid., ss. 14(2)(a), 40(2)(a).
109  Ibid., ss. 17(1), 42(1).
110  Ibid., ss. 17(2), 42(2).
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interference in the life of the adult as much as possible and encourages 
the adult to participate to his maximum extent in decisions and act 
independently when he is able to do so.111 The co-decision-maker is further 
required to act in a way that protects the adult’s civil and human rights.112
Under the new Act, the responsibilities given to both courts and co-
decision-makers are significant. For example, when deciding whether 
to appoint a co-decision-maker or a guardian, the court must consider 
the types of decisions the adult needs to make, the resources available to 
assist the adult in making these decisions including less intrusive forms 
of assistance, the wishes of the adult and the suitability of the decision-
maker.113 This intensive inquiry is a far cry from the early guardianship 
acts, which required little consideration beyond a finding of incapacity. 
Saskatchewan’s Act represents the next major wave of reform and has 
been a model for similar legislation, such as the Bill currently under 
consideration in Alberta. 
IV. REFORM
Canada is currently in its third wave of guardianship reform.114 The 
first wave occurred in the 1970s and was concentrated in Alberta and 
Saskatchewan, as discussed above.115 The second wave was concentrated in 
the Atlantic Provinces and focused on adult protection.116 Consequently, 
many Atlantic Provinces have thorough adult protection schemes 
111  Ibid., ss. 25(b), 25(c), 50(b), 50(c).
112  Ibid., ss. 25(a), 50(a).
113  Sask. Act 2000, supra note 2, s. 13(1).
114  Gordon, “Assisted,” supra note 23 at 61.
115  Ibid.
116  Ibid. The 1980s in particular saw a surge of media attention focused on elder abuse, 
which may have precipitated this wave of reform. See e.g. Ann Silversides, “The golden 
years can be a tarnished horror,” The Globe and Mail (22 July 1989) 6; Judy Creighton, 
“National survey to probe abuse of seniors,” The Ottawa Citizen (15 May 1989) D7; 
“Caregiver stress linked to abuse of the elderly,” The Vancouver Sun (13 January 1987) C2.
Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies 139Vol. 18
not available elsewhere in the country.117 Below, I will briefly examine 
criticisms of old acts, as well as reasons for, and examples of, guardianship 
reform.
A. Criticisms of Old Acts
Criticism of then-existing guardianship laws emerged in the 1970s and 
1980s.118 Originally seen as a benevolent act of the State, the perception 
shifted to a view of guardianship as “a massive intrusion upon the 
autonomy and independence of those adjudicated incompetent and in 
need of a guardian. In the eyes of some, guardianship ceased to be a 
solution and became the problem.”119 Members of the legal community 
began to question whether guardianship was serving its intended purpose 
of protecting the elderly and people with mental disabilities or whether it 
actually further infringed their fundamental rights.120 
Many flaws of the older acts were critically observed in the above 
examination of Saskatchewan and Alberta legislation. Some of the 
worst features of these acts included lack of notice to the adult, inability 
to separate property and personal guardianship orders, lack of partial 
guardianship and statutory language that was “epithetical, anachronistic 
and stigmatizing.”121 Critics particularly disapproved of the intrusive “all 
117  See e.g. Prince Edward Island’s Protection Act, supra note 13; Nova Scotia’s Adult 
Protection Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 2. In designing a guardianship regime based on 
Saskatchewan’s Act, provinces should consider integrating elements of these protection 
regimes. However, such integration must be done carefully, given that the broad terms 
characteristic of protection regimes may conflict with co-decision-making orders. For an 
examination of adult protection regimes in the American context, see Mike Hatch, “Great 
Expectations—Flawed Implementation: The Dilemma Surrounding Vulnerable Adult 
Protection” (2002-2003) 29 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 9. 
118  Prior to this, criticisms of guardianship laws can be traced back to as early as 1837 
(such as Isaac Ray’s severe criticism of guardianship in The Medical Jurisprudence of 
Insanity), but for the most part criticism was few and far between: McLaughlin, supra note 
41 at 47.
119  Frolik, “Judicial Acceptance,” supra note 5 at 739.
120  Israel Doron, “Elder Guardianship Kaleidoscope—A Comparative Perspective” 
(2002) 16 Int’l J. of Law, Policy and the Family 368 at 369 [Doron, “Kaleidoscope”].
121  McLaughlin, supra note 41 at 50.
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or nothing” approach characteristic of existing legislation, which was 
devastating to personal autonomy.122
B. Reasons for Reform 
Early Canadian guardianship legislation continued essentially unchanged 
for over half a century. However, in 1969 the International League of 
Societies for the Mentally Handicapped held a watershed conference 
and called for the inclusion of personal guardianship in guardianship 
legislation.123 Following this conference Canadian academics, lawyers, and 
civil rights groups urged legislatures to undertake fundamental reform 
of existing guardianship laws and create a new framework that would 
promote both protection and self-determination.124 
Another major catalyst prompting legislative reform was the plethora 
of media attention in the 1970s and 1980s highlighting the outdated, 
archaic laws. Media reports focused heavily on individual stories of 
mental, physical and sexual abuse and exploitation of the guardian 
system. Perhaps the most famous of these media reports is the 
Associated Press report on guardianship, a series of articles published 
in numerous newspapers throughout the United States in 1987.125 These 
reports drew the public spotlight to the existing system’s problems and 
incited policy debate and legislative changes in the United States. These 
reports were picked up in Canada and similar articles were featured in 
the Globe and Mail.126 
However, this series of reports, while very influential in the United States, 
was less so in Canada, because change in Canada had already started with 
Alberta’s 1976 Dependent Adults Act. Still, the Canadian media did play a 
role in bringing the problems of the guardianship system to the forefront 
of Canadian consciousness. This was particularly true in Saskatchewan, 
122  Frolik, “Enemy,” supra note 37 at 347.
123  Kathryn Wissel & Maureen Sanders, “Limited Guardianship for the Mentally 
Retarded” (1977-1978) 8 N.M. L. Rev. 231 at 235.
124  Frolik, “Enemy,” supra note 37 at 347; Gordon et al., “Comment,” supra note 54 at 149.
125  Doron, “Kaleidoscope,” supra note 120 at 369.
126  See e.g. “Abuse of the elderly painful problem” The Globe and Mail (3 January 1987) 1. 
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where local newspapers ran headlines in the 1970s proclaiming “Province’s 
guardianship laws said grossly outdated”127 and “Guardianship laws for 
dependants archaic.”128 
Additionally, the civil rights movement in the 1960s had a profound 
effect on guardianship laws. Prior to this, “the civil rights of people in 
guardianship proceedings were not a consideration.”129 The civil rights 
movement promoted the rights of marginalized people, including the 
elderly and people with disabilities, and recognized the right of people with 
disabilities to citizenship.130
During this time, “normalization” emerged as a defining disability rights 
principle. This principle saw the segregation of people with disabilities as 
a major stigmatizing process.131 Around this time, there was an “increased 
recognition that people who had traditionally been isolated from the 
community could live more independently within the community if 
127  “Province’s guardianship laws said grossly outdated” The [Saskatoon] StarPhoenix (6 
December 1977) 9.
128  “Guardianship laws for dependants archaic” Western Producer (15 December 1977) 
18.
129   Quinn, supra note 92 at 13. 
130  See e.g. Amie Bruggeman’s comment, in the American context, but equally applicable 
in Canada:
During the past twenty years, society has become more aware of the 
capabilities of people with mental retardation and their entitlement to 












the public awakened to the fact that people with mental retardation 
have long been denied full citizenship status guaranteed them by the 
Constitution.
Bruggeman, supra note 50 at 321.
131  McLaughlin, supra note 41 at 28. This principle of normalization stands in stark 
contrast to previous attitudes toward people with disabilities, which had usually involved 
segregation and separation. See e.g. the description of Marshall J. of the United States 
Supreme Court in Alexander v. Choate (1985), 469 U.S. 287 at 461-64:
[T]he mentally retarded have been subject to a “lengthy and tragic 
history” of segregation and discrimination that can only be called 
grotesque....Massive custodial institutions were built to warehouse the 
retarded for life...Segregation was accompanied by eugenic marriage 
and sterilization laws that extinguished for the retarded one of the 
“basic civil rights of man”—the right to marry and procreate.
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proper supports were in place.”132 This idea of integration stems in large 
part from the work of disability rights advocate Jacobus tenBroek133 
who outlined two opposing ways in which society treats people with 
disabilities—custodialism or integration.134 He concluded that integration 
was the most equitable, practicable option, emphasizing the potential 
of people with disabilities for full participation as social and economic 
equals in the community.135 This principle of normalization was 
particularly important in the development of partial guardianship, as 
plenary guardianship was recognized as being at odds with the goal of 
integrating people into the community.136 
C. Examples of Changing Views and Resultant  
Changes to Acts
The above-examined catalysts both provided an impetus for reform 
and also, perhaps more importantly, represented a shift in ideas about 
guardianship, including its foundational principles and justifications,  
which guided the reform of legislation.137 This reform movement 
132  Surtees, Co-Decision Making, supra note 19 at 5.
133  tenBroek was a blind lawyer who advocated for the rights of people with disabilities 
to live in their communities. See particularly Jacobus tenBroek & Floyd Matson, “The 
Disabled and the Law of Welfare” (1966) 54 Cal. L. Rev. 809.
134  Robert Burgdorf, “‘Substantially Limited’ Protection from Disability Discrimination: 
The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of Disability” (1997) 
42 Vill. L. Rev. 409 at 513.
135  Ibid. at 514.
136  Frolik, “Judicial Acceptance,” supra note 5 at 746. However, despite recent reform, 
partial guardianship is still rarely employed because plenary guardianship is viewed as 
easier and more efficient: ibid. at 741.
137  On the other hand, there may be an argument that these reforms did not represent 


















regime”: Frolik, “Judicial Acceptance,” supra note 5 at 740. Perhaps this is because there 
was no fundamental shift in our understanding of guardianship itself; the reasons, basis 
and purpose of it were still viewed in the same paternalistic, protection-promoting light. 
Language associated with guardianship and adults retained some elements of paternity 
and condescension.  For example, Frolik, in describing reforms such as mandatory 
counsel, writes that they were instituted to “protect the liberty interests of persons 
accused of being mentally incapacitated”: ibid. at 349 [emphasis added]. Note the 
offensive language—accused—as though people with disabilities did something wrong 
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“interjected new values into guardianship.”138 
One such example is the change in societal understandings of capacity. An 
increased understanding of human functioning led to the recognition that 
humans have a range of functioning, rather than simplistic classifications 
of “disabled” and “not disabled.”139 Indeed, “for each human function, 
some individuals excel, some perform minimally or not at all and 
others perform at all levels and gradations in between.”140 This change in 
understanding of capacity led to the development of partial guardianship, 
which allowed “tailor-made” orders to be designed according to each 
adult’s particular needs and abilities.  Partial guardianship recognized 
a range of human functioning and acknowledged that adults may have 
or there is something wrong with them. Such attitudes seem more in line with previous 
attitudes of guardianship, not the new understandings discussed above. As another 
example, in 1995, the Nova Scotia Law Reform Commission released a proposal for a 
new guardianship law, with a goal that the law be “accessible and affordable while giving 
the necessary protection to those subject to adult guardianship”: Law Reform Commission 
of Nova Scotia, Final Report: Reform of Laws Dealing with Adult Guardianship and 
Personal Health Care Decision (Halifax, Law Reform Commission, 1995) at 17 [emphasis 
added] [N.S. LRC Report]. Such views still identify protection as the main purpose of 
guardianship acts, rather than focusing on enhancing the adult’s decision-making abilities. 
Indeed, as Frolik noted:
Reformers have been disappointed that the reforms have not noticeably 
changed the climate of values that drive the guardianship system. 
Protection of the person and property of the ward still seem to be 
the main goal of guardianship, rather than assisting individuals with 
reduced capacity to retain control of their lives
Frolik, “Enemy,” supra note 37 at 349.
138  Frolik, “Judicial Acceptance,” supra note 5 at 739.
139  Quinn, supra note 92 at 49. 
140  Burgdorf, supra note 133 at 522. In the context of disability discrimination, Burgdorf 
also notes that:
The first prerequisite for addressing disability discrimination is to come 
to grips with the underlying reality of human abilities and disabilities. 
Though we are conditioned to think otherwise, human beings do not 
really exist in two sharply distinct groups, people with disabilities and 
those without disabilities. The “spectrum of abilities” concept seeks to 
describe how things really are and recognizes that some arbitrariness 
inheres in the determination that a certain degree of impairment of 
particular functions constitutes disability...instead of two separate and 
distinct classes, “there are spectrums of physical and mental abilities 
that range from superlative to minimal or non-functional.”
Ibid. at 519 [footnotes omitted]. 
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capacity in some areas and not others. Before this development, adults 
with mental disabilities tended to lose their individual identity to the 
generalizations of the condition: once they were identified as having a 
mental disability, incompetency was assumed.141 Plenary orders epitomized 
this generalization, as they ignored an adult’s individual abilities. Partial 
guardianship was developed to rectify this problem.
In Western societies, the recognition of autonomy as a foundational human 
right also changed guardianship systems. Legislation from the last three 
decades is marked by “the desire to legally intrude as little as possible in the 
lives of people with diminished capacity,”142 reflecting the fact that “[r]espect 
for autonomy is now well established as one of the fundamental principles 
of bioethics.”143 Many statutes have mirrored these changing values, 
and many provinces now statutorily mandate that courts order the least 
intrusive measure possible and consult with the adult to ascertain her 
wishes as much as possible.144 Additionally, this recognition of autonomy as 
a fundamental value also led to the recognition that adults have a right to 
receive notice of proceedings.145
V. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Given the intrusion on individual autonomy, the issue arises of whether 
guardianship violates s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
141  Bruggeman, supra note 50 at 321. 
142  Quinn, supra note 92 at 49.
143  Richardson, supra note 6 at 703.
144  See e.g. Sask. Act 2000, supra note 2, ss. 3(d), 3(f); Alta. Act 2000, supra note 73, s. 
19(1)(c); Ont. Act, supra note 10, ss. 66(9), 66(5); Man. Act, supra note 29, ss. 75, 76(1)(a); 
N.W.T. Act, supra note 15, ss. 12(12), 12(8); Y.K. Act, supra note 14, ss. 2(c), 2(b).
145  Frolik, “Judicial Acceptance,” supra note 5 at 740. “It is now generally acknowledged 
by those practitioners involved in guardianships that the person who is the subject of a 
proposed guardianship has a right to know that the petition is pending and to know what 
her legal rights are in relation to this legal proceeding”: Quinn, supra note 92 at 13.
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Freedoms,146 which guarantees “the right to life, liberty and security of the 
person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with 
the principles of fundamental justice.”147
Determining the constitutionality of guardianship legislation under s. 7 
involves three stages. First, we must first determine whether the legislation 
engages the life, liberty or security interests protected by s. 7. 148 Second, we 
must determine whether those interests, if engaged, are engaged in a way 
that conforms to the principles of fundamental justice. If not, the final step 
is to examine whether the impugned legislation can be saved under s. 1 of 
the Charter.
With respect to the security interest, the Supreme Court has noted that this 
interest encompasses both physical and emotional integrity,149 basic human 
dignity150 and some element of personal autonomy, including “the right to 
make choices concerning one’s own body.”151 Given the broad scope of the 
security interest, it is likely that an adult’s security interests are engaged 
146  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [Charter].
147  Ibid., s. 7. This issue was extensively addressed in the somewhat dated article Robert 
Gordon & Simon Verdun-Jones, “The Implications of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms for the law relating to guardianship and trusteeship” (1987) 10 Int’l J.L. & 
Psychiatry 21. See also Gordon et al., “Comment,” supra note 54 at 150. 
148  In Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) [1985] 2 S.C.R. 
486, 23 C.C.C. (3d) 289 [Re BCMVA], the Supreme Court recognized that life, liberty and 
security in s. 7 encompass three distinct, independent interests that should be addressed 
individually.
149  R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, 44 D.L.R. (4th) 385 at para. 28. In New 
Brunswick (Minister of Health & Community Services) v. G. (J.), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46, 177 
D.L.R. (4th) 124 at para. 60, the Supreme Court further delineated the scope of emotional 
integrity:
For a restriction of security of the person to be made out, then, the 
impugned state action must have a serious and profound effect on a 
person’s psychological integrity. The effects of the state interference 
must be assessed objectively, with a view to their impact on the 
psychological integrity of a person of reasonable sensibility. This need 
not rise to the level of nervous shock or psychiatric illness, but must be 
greater than ordinary stress or anxiety.
150  Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519, 107 D.L.R. 
(4th) 342 at para. 21.
151  Ibid.
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by a guardianship order. Clearly, by granting legal decision-making 
power to another person, the order affects the adult’s ability to make 
choices for herself, including the choices within the realm of personal 
autonomy protected by the Charter. For example, under the Saskatchewan 
Act, guardians can be given authority to determine the adult’s living 
arrangements, social activities, health care, diet, dress and hygiene.152 
Surely these extremely private and personal decisions are included within 
the Charter-protected choices concerning one’s body. Moreover, one could 
also argue that guardianship legislation strips adults of their personal 
dignity by removing their decision-making capacity. In Germany, for 
example, guardianship was rejected on the basis that a declaration of “legal 
incompetence” was derogatory and implied the loss of basic rights of the 
adult.153 This would also engage the security interest. 
With respect to the liberty interest, the Supreme Court has recognized 
that this interest encompasses the right to be free from “imprisonment, 
detention, or any form of control or of constraint on freedom of 
movement.”154 While initially it seems that this interest is not engaged, the 
Saskatchewan Act does allow guardians to make decisions with respect 
to an adult’s restraint.155 I would therefore suggest that this interest is 
also engaged. The adult’s lack of capacity is not an obstacle to engaging 
these interests, as the adult’s constitutional rights are not diminished or 
expunged by a finding of incapacity.156
Given that the security and liberty interests of an adult under a 
guardianship order are engaged, we must next consider whether the 
impingement is consistent with the principles of fundamental justice. In 
152  Sask. Act 2000, supra note 2, s. 15.
153  D. Gove & J. Georges, “Perspective on Legislation Relating to the Rights and 
Protection of People with Dementia in Europe” (2001) 5 Aging & Mental Health 316 at 
317.
154  B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315, 122 
D.L.R. (4th) 1 at para. 33 [B.(R).].
155  Sask. Act 2000, supra note 2, s. 15(i).
156  See e.g. Re Weisgerber, 2003 ABQB 619, 2 E.T.R. (3d) 253 at para. 30, where the 
judge affirmed that the rights of an adult under the Charter do not disappear with a 
guardianship order.
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Re BCMVA, the Supreme Court affirmed that these principles are both 
substantive and procedural and “found in the basic tenets and principles, 
not only of our judicial process, but also of the other components of our 
legal system.”157 
The Nova Scotia Supreme Court Family Division addressed this 
particular issue in Nova Scotia (Minister of Health) v. J.(J.)158 on an 
application to review a wardship order made under the Adult Protection 
Act.159 Despite being somewhat dated, and a lower court case, this 
judgment is important because it thoroughly addresses the related 
constitutional issues, which many courts in guardianship proceedings 
do only superficially. The Court noted that the “real task comes [in] 
defining, in this context, the principles of fundamental justice”160 and 
identified numerous procedural principles of fundamental justice, 
including reasonable notice with particulars, a neutral arbitrator and an 
opportunity to present one’s case effectively (which may include the right 
to counsel).161 Gordon and Verdun-Jones also identify procedural fairness 
protections that are likely constitutionally protected, including the right 
to be heard, the right to be treated impartially, the right to be notified of 
157  Re BCMVA, supra note 148 at para. 72. In R. v. Malmo-Levine, the Court set out the 
requirements for a rule to constitute a principle of fundamental justice:
In short, for a rule or principle to constitute a principle of fundamental 
justice for the purposes of s. 7, it must be a legal principle about which 
there is significant societal consensus that it is fundamental to the 
way in which the legal system ought fairly to operate, and it must be 
identified with sufficient precision to yield a manageable standard 
against which to measure deprivations of life, liberty or security of the 
person. 
R. v. Malmo-Levine, 2003 SCC 74, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571, 179 C.C.C. (3d) 417 at para. 113.
158  Nova Scotia (Minister of Health) v. J.(J.), 2001 NSSF 12, 193 N.S.R. (2d) 13, 602 A.P.R. 
13 [J.(J.)].
159  Note that this was a review for a wardship order, not a guardianship order. Note also 
that this case was one of a series of cases determining J.(J.)’s rights: See also Re J.(J.), 2002 
NSSF 19, 202 N.S.R. (2d) 362; Nova Scotia (Minister of Health) v. J.J., [2005] 1 S.C.R. 177, 
2005 SCC 12. Unfortunately, the other decisions did not address the Charter implications 
of wardship and are therefore not relevant to the following discussion. The 2001 lower 
court decision is particularly important because it does address these important Charter 
issues.
160  J.(J.), supra note 158 at para. 88.
161  Ibid. at para. 91.
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a hearing and the right to reasons.162 
If we use these foundations as a starting point, we should be able to paint 
a tentative picture of whether guardianship orders are carried out in a 
manner consistent with the principles of fundamental justice. In order to 
pass constitutional muster, I suggest that guardianship legislation must 
provide for the above procedural safeguards.  
One such procedural safeguard is the requirement of notice. The Court 
in J.(J.) noted that procedural protections include the right to “have a 
‘meaningful’ opportunity to be heard.”163 Surely, in order for the adult to 
have a meaningful opportunity to be heard, the adult must have notice 
of the proceedings. Most guardianship statutes require notice to be 
served on the adult,164 but courts can also dispense with notice. Clearly, 
dispensing with notice should not occur without serious reflection on the 
constitutional ramifications. Additionally, merely giving notice may not be 
sufficient, because “[i]f the allegations in the petition for guardianship have 
merit, the proposed ward may have trouble deciphering, understanding, or 
following the directions of the summons.”165 Accordingly, the adult may not 
understand the nature of the documents served, and “service” may not be 
sufficient to allow the adult to participate.
Further, in regards to substantive protection, the Court in J.(J.) found that, 
in order for the constitutional standard to be met, the court must have the 
power to limit intervention and access after wardship and that the use of 
permanent wardship orders should be limited.166 While most guardianship 
legislation has been reformed since the advent of the Charter to allow for 
partial guardianship, the holding in J.(J.) suggests that courts may be willing 
to read into a statute the power to grant partial guardianship, in order to 
162  Gordon & Verdun-Jones, supra note 147 at 26-27.
163  J.(J.), supra note 158 at para. 118.
164  See e.g. Alta. Act 2000, supra note 73, s. 3(2)(a); Sask. Act 2000, supra note 2, s. 31(1)
(a), Ont. Act, supra note 10, s. 27(4); N.W.T. Act, supra note 15, s. 4(2)(a); N.S. Act, supra 
note 17, s. 3(2); Y.K. Act, supra note 14, s. 30(5)(a); Man. Act, supra note 29, s. 63(3)(a).
165  Andrews, supra note 1 at 88.
166  J.(J.), supra note 158 at paras. 20, 91.
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ensure the act passes constitutional muster. Courts may be more willing to 
read in this provision than to strike down legislation, as courts are generally 
cautious when striking down protective, social policy legislation.167
There is very little case law addressing the constitutionality of guardianship, 
suggesting that the majority of guardianship orders are not challenged. 
Even when guardianship orders are in dispute, courts seem hesitant to 
address constitutional issues. For example, in Re C.M.D.,168 the adult sought 
review and termination of an order under Alberta’s Dependent Adults Act 
appointing the adult’s daughter property and personal guardian. The adult 
argued that Charter rights must be considered in determining whether the 
order would continue.169 The Court addressed the matter very superficially, 
noting that the Legislature had included reasons, restrictions and 
terminology in the Act that placed obligations on the Court before issuing 
an order, and that these statutory obligations flowed out of the respect 
for Charter rights.170 The Court seemed to assume that the legislation was 
prima facie constitutional without delving into a deeper Charter analysis. 
However, in Fleming v. Reid,171 the Ontario Court of Appeal found sections 
of the Mental Health Act,172 which allowed a board to compel involuntary 
incompetent patients to take drugs contrary to the instructions of 
substitute decision-makers, unconstitutional.173 In making their decisions, 
the substitute decision-makers had relied on the prior competent wishes 
of the patients.174 The Court found the impugned provisions denied the 
adult’s right to security guaranteed under s. 7 of the Charter and could not 
be saved under s. 1.175 In doing so, the Court delineated the scope of the 
common law right to bodily integrity and personal autonomy, including 
167  Ibid. at para. 93.
168  2001 ABQB 883; [2001] A.J. No. 1364.
169  Ibid. at paras. 1-3, 25.
170  Ibid. at para. 26. For example, the Court noted that the Act required “the Order or its 
continuation must ‘substantially benefit’ and ‘be in the best interests of ’ the adult”: ibid.; 
Alta. Act 1980, supra note 73, s. 4.
171  (1991), 48 O.A.C. 46, 82 D.L.R. (4th) 298 [Reid].
172  R.S.O. 1980, c. 262.
173  Reid, supra note 171 at paras. 31, 47, 60. 
174  Ibid. at para. 5.
175  Ibid. at paras. 31, 60-62.
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the right to refuse medical treatment, and concluded that this protection 
of personal autonomy and self-determination “is so entrenched in the 
traditions of our law as to be ranked as fundamental and deserving of 
the highest order of protection. This right forms an essential part of an 
individual’s security of the person and must be included in the liberty 
interests protected by s. 7.”176 Clearly, the Court was willing to find that 
the intrusion on the adult’s sphere of autonomy was a violation of s.7, 
suggesting that other guardianship legislation which intrudes on this 
sphere is also unconstitutional. However, there are several distinguishing 
factors which bode well for guardianship legislation. First, the impugned 
sections allowed the board to act in a way that was contrary to the 
wishes of substitute decision-makers and the prior expressed wishes of 
then-competent patients. The result would likely be different if a legally 
appointed guardian had consented to treatment on behalf of the adult. In 
such a case, the guardian’s consent would be taken as the adult’s consent, 
and the issue would not have been about non-consensual treatment. 
Second, in its s. 1 analysis, the Court notes that the right to be free from 
non-consensual treatment is not absolute, but safeguards must be in 
place to protect the adult’s interest.177 Many guardianship statutes now 
have safeguards, including review orders, mandatory advocates and 
notice requirements, and consequently, even if guardianship legislation is 
found to violate s. 7, it would likely be saved under s. 1.
VI. ALTERNATIVES TO GUARDIANSHIP
In any discussion of guardianship, it is important to consider the 
alternatives available. In Saskatchewan, there are various other tools that 
can be used in addition to or instead of guardianship, including powers 
of attorney and health care directives. Indeed, often all of these tools will 
be employed, because mental ability is a continuum; a power of attorney 
176  Ibid. at para. 41.
177  Ibid. at para. 62.
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may be appropriate at one time and a guardianship order may be necessary 
later.178 In addition to these alternatives, I will also examine guardianship-
like assistance regimes that have replaced guardianship in other countries.
A. Enduring Power of Attorney
A power of attorney (POA) is an agreement where one person appoints 
another to look after matters specified in the POA.179 A POA may be 
conditional or contingent on a future event, such as loss of capacity, or 
it may be effective from the moment it is signed. An enduring POA is 
not terminated when the adult loses capacity.180 Depending on specified 
powers, enduring POAs can function much like guardianship orders, 
giving the attorney authority over listed powers. Under a POA, the adult 
can still do all the things that the attorney has been appointed to do, such 
as signing cheques; however, this duality does not apply if the adult loses 
capacity. In Saskatchewan, similar to guardianship legislation, POAs can 
separate personal and property matters.181 
POAs provide several advantages over guardianship. First, the scope of 
a POA “is limited only by the intent of the principal, as set forth in the 
executing document.”182 Thus, the adult has the ability to determine the 
matters over which the attorney will have authority. This approach is more 
respectful of the adult’s right to self-determination than a guardianship 
178  See Lawrence Frolik, “Plenary Guardianship: An Analysis, a Critique and a Proposal 
for Reform” (1981) 23 Ariz. L. Rev. 599 at 631-32.
179  The Powers of Attorney Act, 2002, S.S. 2002, c. P-20.3, s. 14(1) [The POA Act]. The Act 
provides:
A grantor may give an attorney:
 (a) specific authority respecting certain property or financial  
       matters;
 (b) general authority respecting all of the grantor’s property  
       and financial affairs;
 (c) specific authority respecting certain personal matters; or
 (d) general authority respecting all of the grantor’s personal  
       affairs.
Ibid., s. 14(2). 
180  Ibid., s. 3.
181  Ibid. s. 4.1(1).
182  Holmes, supra note 7 at 609.
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order, which gives the adult no say in this matter. Further, POAs can 
be narrowed and tailored in a way that is not possible under plenary 
guardianship. A POA can address an adult’s particular situation and 
include limitations and restrictions, require accounting to other family 
members, or provide for other safeguards.183
However, there are also problems with POAs. For example, POAs will 
not work for people who have never had capacity and would be unable 
to grant a POA under the Act. Accordingly, if POAs were the sole option, 
a portion of the population would be left without a guardianship-type 
mechanism. Additionally, many people lose capacity without creating a 
POA, either because they did not consider it or capacity was suddenly 
lost. Unfortunately, the forethought required by POAs does not always 
occur. For these reasons, I would suggest that POAs could not fully replace 
guardianship regimes.
B. Health Care Directives and Proxies 
A health care directive gives directions relating to an adult’s health care 
decisions, the appointment of a proxy or both.184 A directive comes into 
effect when the adult loses capacity to make health care decisions and 
remains in effect until the adult recovers capacity.185 Where a directive 
anticipates and instructs treatment in a particular circumstance, the 
decision in the directive is taken as the adult’s decision.186 A directive can 
also appoint a proxy to make health care decisions according to the adult’s 
known wishes, or the best interests of the adult if wishes are not known.187 
The most obvious problem with a health care directive is its narrow scope. 
It applies only to health care decisions, a very narrow range of personal 
issues, and does not deal with property at all. This factor alone prevents it 
183  See e.g. The POA Act, supra note 179, s. 17(3)(b)(ii). 
184  Health Care Directives and Substitute Health Care Decision Makers Act, S.S. 1997, c. 
H-0.001, s. 2(1)(c).
185  Ibid., s. 4.
186  Ibid., s. 5(1).
187  Ibid., s. 12.
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from usurping the role of guardianship legislation.
C. Assistance Regimes
Some people argue that guardianship should be done away with all together.  
Critics argue that “guardianship should never be a legal option since it 
discriminates against people and is a legal tool which takes away the freedom 
of people who have done nothing wrong.”188 Critics also argue that “Charter-
proofing” guardianship laws only results in a facade of acceptability,189 when 
the underlying assumptions themselves are what should be challenged. 
Germany, for example, has replaced guardianship with “care and 
assistance” (Betreuung). The legislation, enacted in 1992, allows the court 
to tailor specific tasks for the caretaker to fulfill and requires the caretaker 
to receive judicial authorization for important decisions, such as high-risk 
medical treatment.190 Under the German system, the individual does not 
lose his legal status or any other legal rights.191 
Similarly, in 1990, Norway introduced legislation that allows for assisting 
representatives or support persons.192 Under an assisting representative 
order, the adult’s legal capacity is removed only in carefully prescribed 
circumstances.193 A support person assists the adult in expressing her 
interests.194 
While these regimes are somewhat similar to guardianship, they emphasize 
needs-based approaches, focusing on the adult’s decision-making and 
communication abilities. Further, these alternatives do away with the 
188  N.S. LRC Report, supra note 137 at 19.
189  Ibid.
190  Kees Blankman, “Guardianship Models in the Netherlands and Western Europe” 
(1997) 20 Int’l J.L. & Psychiatry 47 at 54.
191  Yuval Melamed, Israel Doron & Dan Shnitt, “Guardianship of people with mental 
disorders” (2007) 65 Social Science & Medicine 1118 at 1119.
192  Gordon, “Assisted,” supra note 23 at 63.
193  Ibid.
194  Ibid.
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stigma associated with guardianship. As demonstrated by Germany’s 
legislation, it is not inevitable that an adult must lose his capacity under 
guardianship-type orders. Canada should consider this principle in 
designing new legislation. Importantly, in advocating for co-decision-
making regimes, I note that adults under a co-decision-making order in 
Saskatchewan do not lose legal capacity.
VII. CONCLUSION
Current guardianship legislation reflects a constant tension between 
autonomy and protection. Past acts favoured protection, but a recent 
shift toward autonomy has occurred as legislators struggle to find the 
appropriate balance.  This balance may be unattainable: autonomy and 
protection may well be diametrically opposed. However, I would suggest 
that Saskatchewan’s Act and its co-decision-making provisions are as near 
to that balance as is available anywhere in the country. They constitute 
respect for autonomy and promotion of protection, and form a model for 
consideration by other provinces. This is not to suggest that Saskatchewan’s 
law has found that elusive balance. Rather, it represents an important 
attempt to rethink guardianship and weigh competing values.
Given these competing and often conflicting values, it is crucial to 
recognize that guardianship is just one mechanism that can be employed 
to encourage autonomy and advance protection.195 Guardianship has been 
recognized as:
195  Indeed, the law itself is just one mechanism that can and should be used to achieve 
these goals. The law by itself is not enough to achieve these goals, because “society cannot 
legislate the positive attitudes and human relationships that must underlie effective 
protection”: McLaughlin, supra note 41 at 17. We must recognize that “[e]ven a model 
guardianship law will have little impact if it is unsupported by a number of other non-
legal societal developments”: ibid.  Still, legislation that respects the autonomy and dignity 
of the elderly and people with disabilities is an important step to further these progressive 
social attitudes.
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[T]he most intrusive, non-interest serving, impersonal 
legal device known and available to us and as such, one 
which minimizes personal autonomy and respect for the 
individual, has a high potential for doing harm and raises 
at best a questionable benefit/burden ratio. As such, it is a 
device to be studiously avoided.196
However, despite the fact that guardianship can be misused, overreaching 
or abusive, it is not inherently undesirable.197 The benefit-burden ratio 
cannot be considered in the abstract alone:  guardianship may be desirable 
simply because no other feasible options are available. Guardianship 
legislation that respects self-determination and human dignity is essential, 
and can be accomplished through carefully crafted co-decision-making 
provisions such as those found in Saskatchewan’s Act.
196  Windsor Schmidt, “The Wingspan of Wingspread: What is known and Not Known 
about the State of the Guardianship and Public Guardianship System Thirteen Years after 
the Wingspread National Guardianship Symposium” (2001-2002) 31 Stetson L. Rev. 1027 
at 1028. 
197  Frolik, “Enemy,” supra note 37 at 350.
